I always think of this problem of reference in relation to the scene from The Lion King in which Timon, Pumba, and Simba take turns describing the stars:
Ha, very much! I almost disagreed because of their different classifications of the stars. But you are correct. They are clearly talking about the same objects, but they are not sure what those objects are.
So if my LDS friend thinks God is a bodily being and I think he's immaterial, we can still be looking at the same thing, speculating differently about the star that is God.
Thank you for this refreshing breath of common sense how much an online world of much finger-pointing. I have heard Orthodox and Catholic commentators claiming that one another’s communions worship different gods, before they even get started on Protestants, Jews or Muslims. Quite mad.
Exactly! If Aquinas thought the Islamic scholars were obviously talking about the same God, then we have all gotten way too narrow. As evidenced by freshman me saying that Catholics and Protestants worship different gods.
Thank you for this refreshing breath of common sense among an online world of much finger-pointing. I have heard Orthodox and Catholic commentators claiming that one another’s communions worship different gods, before they even get started on Protestants, Jews or Muslims. Quite mad.
What you're saying makes complete sense about reference. But when people ask which God you believe in, are they really asking to what you refer? Or is belief substantially different than reference?
That's a great question. I think that the question "Which God do you believe in?" assumes the descriptive theory. It could be rephrased, "What do you believe about God?" or "Which religion do you accept as the way to God?"
I don't think the difference is between belief and reference but between reference (what one refers to) and what one believes about the referent (how you describe God).
Descriptivism has obvious roots in formalist mathematics. The fact that you list Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell among its proponents is a bit of a clue, there! In formalist mathematics, we do indeed successfully refer to an object if we have a conceptual definition for it. Thus, for example, we might say that a circle consists of a set of points in a two-dimensional plane that are equidistant from one particular point. Whereas, in Platonist mathematics, we might say that a circle is an actually existent, perfect Idea in the world of Ideas.
By contrast, as a matter of ordinary speech, we do not usually make references in this formalist way. We might, instead, simply point to something and say "this," trusting that people will understand what it was that we intended to point to, for example. Or, if we mean not a specific object but a class of objects, then instead of giving a definition we might give a few examples and then ask people to generalise. The latter does not always succeed in creating mutual understanding, mind you. Not everyone agrees, for example, about which things are "cool" in the sense of being fashionable, not even if they are part of a shared social group that might be striving for a coherent local concept thereof.
So, is God a similar type of thing to a mathematical concept? If so, are we formalists about mathematics, or not? Or is God more like a specific thing, to which one might point and say "this"? If so, there might even be people who successfully refer to God without knowing that they are doing so, in the same way that we might reach out to an object and say "this one" even before we've properly looked at it. Perhaps God is even, somehow, both of these things, a concept and an object and more besides. We might say on this basis that there are many ways to successfully refer to God. Or, we might go in the direction of apophasis and say that only by the grace of God do any of our imperfect references successfully land at all.
As a matter of my basic intuitions, I've always thought it makes more sense to say that Muslims are wrong about God than to say they worship another God.
On the other hand, Scripture indicates that denying the Son leaves one radically and hopelessly alienated from God. "I never knew you."
I've always thought that there's a Ship of Theseus analogy in here. How much can I deny about God before I'm no longer discussing God?
In which case denying the Son is perhaps akin to the ship in question being composed of the same timber, but no longer having any means of propulsion: no sails or oars. Not all that much is changed physically, but is it even still a ship?
Thanks! I agree about scriptures, emphasis, but that seems to be about salvation, not about knowledge of God.
Generally, I’m inclined to say the Abraham religions and the heretical sex are certainly all talking about God, and then we can ask about eastern religions, Zeus, and so on - which is definitely more complex.
I'm inclined to agree with all of that, but yet I still have some doubts that it's completely correct. Which is why I'm digging a little more here.
Maybe what's missing in this discussion is that per Scripture, there IS such a thing as a false god. So if we want to draw a strong distinction between worshipping a false god and being very wrong about the one true God, we would need some clear criteria distinguishing between the two. Is it holding to some of the Old Testament stories? Most of the Old Testament stories? Is it the 4 Omnis? Can you get by with 2 or 3 Omnis?
To that effect, with regards to the Son, I don't think that the testimony of Scripture here is strictly about salvation. There's also some knowledge about God being imparted. Scripture seems to be indicating to us that Christ's nature as the Son of God is an extremely important fact about God -- more important than typical human intuition might indicate. Does that mean it's on par with the Omnis? I don't really know.
In the end, when it comes to drawing a strong distinction between worshipping a false god and being very wrong about God, the clearest answer I can come up with from Scripture is "Somewhere between the errors of the Pharisees (who are not described as worshipping a false god) and those of e.g. the Baal-worshippers (who are)."
Unfortunately, in my best understanding I think Muslims ARE in this very large gray area. Though even if more wrong than the Pharisees, almost surely much closer to them than to the Baalites, which is why I'm inclined to think you're probably right.
No, only that when they say "God," they are referring to God! Rather than saying the Muslim worships a different god, we can say that Muslim has false beliefs about God, that his worship is unacceptable to God, that he does not come to God through Christ, and so on.
Aquinas used the Islamic theologians' work in his theology. He would have thought they were stating a great many truths about the one God, but that there were other things they were missing and things they got wrong.
It's also possible that some of them are referring to, as C. S. Lewis has it, Tash. Maybe they are! But from the fact that Islam is a false religion it does not follow that Muslims are not referring to God when they say "God," nor that they worship a different god. (There is no other.)
I don't know that there's any persuasion necessary. It's a nuance that I'll cede without argument. I'm not sure I'd say it your way but I'm also not trying to engage in heady philosophy. :)
I think it's much more accurate and helpful to say that Mormons and Muslims believe false things about God rather than to say they believe in a different God altogether.
In applying this logic to followers of other non-Abrahamic religions, like Hinduism for example, would we say that those people believe in a different god?
I always think of this problem of reference in relation to the scene from The Lion King in which Timon, Pumba, and Simba take turns describing the stars:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1O57ZijwPQ
Timon - Fireflies
Pumba - Balls of gas burning millions of miles away
Simba - Past ancestors
Clearly, their descriptions are wildly different, but they are all trying to understand the same objects.
Ha, very much! I almost disagreed because of their different classifications of the stars. But you are correct. They are clearly talking about the same objects, but they are not sure what those objects are.
So if my LDS friend thinks God is a bodily being and I think he's immaterial, we can still be looking at the same thing, speculating differently about the star that is God.
Thank you for this refreshing breath of common sense how much an online world of much finger-pointing. I have heard Orthodox and Catholic commentators claiming that one another’s communions worship different gods, before they even get started on Protestants, Jews or Muslims. Quite mad.
Exactly! If Aquinas thought the Islamic scholars were obviously talking about the same God, then we have all gotten way too narrow. As evidenced by freshman me saying that Catholics and Protestants worship different gods.
Thank you for this refreshing breath of common sense among an online world of much finger-pointing. I have heard Orthodox and Catholic commentators claiming that one another’s communions worship different gods, before they even get started on Protestants, Jews or Muslims. Quite mad.
What you're saying makes complete sense about reference. But when people ask which God you believe in, are they really asking to what you refer? Or is belief substantially different than reference?
That's a great question. I think that the question "Which God do you believe in?" assumes the descriptive theory. It could be rephrased, "What do you believe about God?" or "Which religion do you accept as the way to God?"
I don't think the difference is between belief and reference but between reference (what one refers to) and what one believes about the referent (how you describe God).
Descriptivism has obvious roots in formalist mathematics. The fact that you list Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell among its proponents is a bit of a clue, there! In formalist mathematics, we do indeed successfully refer to an object if we have a conceptual definition for it. Thus, for example, we might say that a circle consists of a set of points in a two-dimensional plane that are equidistant from one particular point. Whereas, in Platonist mathematics, we might say that a circle is an actually existent, perfect Idea in the world of Ideas.
By contrast, as a matter of ordinary speech, we do not usually make references in this formalist way. We might, instead, simply point to something and say "this," trusting that people will understand what it was that we intended to point to, for example. Or, if we mean not a specific object but a class of objects, then instead of giving a definition we might give a few examples and then ask people to generalise. The latter does not always succeed in creating mutual understanding, mind you. Not everyone agrees, for example, about which things are "cool" in the sense of being fashionable, not even if they are part of a shared social group that might be striving for a coherent local concept thereof.
So, is God a similar type of thing to a mathematical concept? If so, are we formalists about mathematics, or not? Or is God more like a specific thing, to which one might point and say "this"? If so, there might even be people who successfully refer to God without knowing that they are doing so, in the same way that we might reach out to an object and say "this one" even before we've properly looked at it. Perhaps God is even, somehow, both of these things, a concept and an object and more besides. We might say on this basis that there are many ways to successfully refer to God. Or, we might go in the direction of apophasis and say that only by the grace of God do any of our imperfect references successfully land at all.
You have convinced me to be more charitable in the future and just call everyone else a heretic instead of claiming they worship a different God. :-)
Ha, that's it! A Christian heretic inhabits the Christian imaginary, refers to God above, and has some seriously false beliefs about both. :)
Thanks Joel, this is an interesting discussion.
As a matter of my basic intuitions, I've always thought it makes more sense to say that Muslims are wrong about God than to say they worship another God.
On the other hand, Scripture indicates that denying the Son leaves one radically and hopelessly alienated from God. "I never knew you."
I've always thought that there's a Ship of Theseus analogy in here. How much can I deny about God before I'm no longer discussing God?
In which case denying the Son is perhaps akin to the ship in question being composed of the same timber, but no longer having any means of propulsion: no sails or oars. Not all that much is changed physically, but is it even still a ship?
Thanks! I agree about scriptures, emphasis, but that seems to be about salvation, not about knowledge of God.
Generally, I’m inclined to say the Abraham religions and the heretical sex are certainly all talking about God, and then we can ask about eastern religions, Zeus, and so on - which is definitely more complex.
I'm inclined to agree with all of that, but yet I still have some doubts that it's completely correct. Which is why I'm digging a little more here.
Maybe what's missing in this discussion is that per Scripture, there IS such a thing as a false god. So if we want to draw a strong distinction between worshipping a false god and being very wrong about the one true God, we would need some clear criteria distinguishing between the two. Is it holding to some of the Old Testament stories? Most of the Old Testament stories? Is it the 4 Omnis? Can you get by with 2 or 3 Omnis?
To that effect, with regards to the Son, I don't think that the testimony of Scripture here is strictly about salvation. There's also some knowledge about God being imparted. Scripture seems to be indicating to us that Christ's nature as the Son of God is an extremely important fact about God -- more important than typical human intuition might indicate. Does that mean it's on par with the Omnis? I don't really know.
In the end, when it comes to drawing a strong distinction between worshipping a false god and being very wrong about God, the clearest answer I can come up with from Scripture is "Somewhere between the errors of the Pharisees (who are not described as worshipping a false god) and those of e.g. the Baal-worshippers (who are)."
Unfortunately, in my best understanding I think Muslims ARE in this very large gray area. Though even if more wrong than the Pharisees, almost surely much closer to them than to the Baalites, which is why I'm inclined to think you're probably right.
Are you saying that an “orthodox” Muslim has saving faith?
No, only that when they say "God," they are referring to God! Rather than saying the Muslim worships a different god, we can say that Muslim has false beliefs about God, that his worship is unacceptable to God, that he does not come to God through Christ, and so on.
Aquinas used the Islamic theologians' work in his theology. He would have thought they were stating a great many truths about the one God, but that there were other things they were missing and things they got wrong.
It's also possible that some of them are referring to, as C. S. Lewis has it, Tash. Maybe they are! But from the fact that Islam is a false religion it does not follow that Muslims are not referring to God when they say "God," nor that they worship a different god. (There is no other.)
Thoughts?
Not going to quibble over anything beyond that. :)
Ha ha, I don’t expect everyone to be persuaded on my first try! A second article should have you persuaded. 😆
I don't know that there's any persuasion necessary. It's a nuance that I'll cede without argument. I'm not sure I'd say it your way but I'm also not trying to engage in heady philosophy. :)
Very insightful!
I think it's much more accurate and helpful to say that Mormons and Muslims believe false things about God rather than to say they believe in a different God altogether.
In applying this logic to followers of other non-Abrahamic religions, like Hinduism for example, would we say that those people believe in a different god?