I do think Richard is better as a philosopher, he’s substantially older and deeper into the material, the history and arguments, but Walker has his own strengths as a cultural commentator and much else:
I didn't go into the epistemological detail in the article, but here's what I think "common ground" refers to: Common rational grounding for belief. The presuppositionalist view is that all thought begins from fundamental presuppositions, and those differ across worldviews. The only test of those fundamental presuppositions is the coherence of the worldview that flows from them.
I find, instead, that all ideological thinking, both materialist and theological, begins from presuppositions that the ideologues are either unable or unwilling to examine more deeply. True philosophical aims to examine even these presuppositions, and so, to leave no stone unturned. There are representatives of such thought among believers and unbelievers; Socrates, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Elizabeth Anscombe come to mind.
These thinkers begin from the common rational grounding of universal human experience and careful philosophical thought.
Have I mischaracterized the presupp view though? I don't see that we mean something different by "common ground." I think we disagree about whether there is common ground between and unbelievers. :)
‘Presuppositional’ is a somewhat ambiguous term. The tradition in America comes down from Cornelius Van Til. Then as I understand the landscape it branches into softer and harder versions. The mild version would be that of Francis Schaeffer. He simply emphasized that the unbeliever, based solely upon his stated beliefs, presuppositions would find it difficult or impossible to live his life. Because we are all made in the Image of God, we thirst for meaning and morality, truth and justice, which are meaningless in the atheist’s universe. So inevitably the unbelievers will reach over into the believer’s Judeo-Christian meaning system and borrow whole categories (e.g. human rights) to get through their day. Finding this point of tension, where the unbeliever must ‘cheat’ offers an opening for evangelism.
The harder Presup tradition comes down via Greg Bahnsen and those in his school of thought. Von’s doubts about any ‘common ground’ echo these presups’ insistence that there is no ‘neutral ground.’ For more, listen to Richard. A key point though, is that the Bahnsen tradition says that the unbeliever must PRESUPPOSE that Christianity is true BEFORE he can have any basis for rationality. But when queried on this, Richard finds that this collapses into GOD is the basis for meaning and truth, and NOT the presupposition of God, or Christianity. And Richard points out that everyone on all sides of the debate agree that GOD comes first, but this is not what Bahnsen and seemingly Van Til taught. They apparently DID insist that only after God and/or the Bible and/or Christianity is pressupposed to be true do the pieces all fall into place.
Others, including those in the Reforned tradition like R. C. Sproul object that this is but a circular argument, yielding a syllogism that runs something like this:
Is what you refer to in the first paragraph really the presuppositionalist view? It seems that what you are getting at is just honest foundationalism, where the foundationalist acknowledges his foundational beliefs are not necessarily held by everyone. Doesn't presuppositionalism require one to hold that these presuppositions come from special revelation?
Somewhere (it might or might not be in any of the talks I linked you to) Richard avers that Van Til got his basic framework from the thinker and statesman Abraham Kuyper, who had borrowed key philosophical concepts—mistaken ones to be sure—from Immanuel Kant
Thanks for giving us a view of F3. I found it interesting to reflect on the society you are making there and the things you must all be getting from it.
When it comes to believing in something higher than yourself, how often do abstract concepts play that role? Jesus, Buddha, Allah and the guy next to you are all personified to some extent. Do you get people who throw out things like “truth” or “kindness” as their higher thing that they follow? Would it be accepted if they did?
I ask, because I have recently been mulling on Simone Weil’s admonition that “men whose attention, faith and love are almost exclusively concentrated on the impersonal aspect of God can actually believe themselves and declare themselves to be atheists.” I think she is on to something.
I need some clarification. Are you saying that this professor honestly believed that "Socrates was a utilitarian; he didn’t believe in an afterlife; and Platonism was and is consistent with a scientific worldview?"
How does he explain Phraedo wherein Plato's Socrates speaks of the psyche as immortal? How does he explain the concept of nous (mind) as governing the cosmos (panentheism), which goes back to Eleatics. Much of Plato's Forms or the knowledge of those Forms is premised upon metempsychosis, the Greek equivalent of reincarnation, which Plato picked up from Pythagoras.
Is Prof. B... intimating that Plato is putting words into Socrates' mouth, making Socrates say what Socrates never said? How could he, that dishonest slut! How could Plato get away with such prevarications, especially in light of his contemporaries who could stomp all over such mendacity?
I would contend, having experienced this throughout my life, that one can have no common ground with anyone who is not committed to intellectual integrity, even in part, including hermeneutical integrity. And this is true with regard to theists or non-theists, Christians or non-Christians.
It’s fairly common for philosophers and indeed historians to suggest that Plato’s Socrates does not always correspond to the historical Socrates. Generally, the view I have heard suggests that earlier dialogues are more likely to be records of what Plato remembered Socrates as saying, whereas later dialogues are Plato continuing to use the same literary form in order to develop his own ideas. It’s not that Plato is a liar, but that he started writing in a particular way and then continued in the same form, because the ideas being expounded were more important than who exactly they came from. There was no pre-existing way to record philosophy in a written text, so Plato was kind of making up his way of doing it as he went along.
Thank you for your reply. I do not understand the meaning of "there was no pre-existing way to record philosophy in a written text." I am not denying the stylistic innovations. Have you not read the fairly intact tracts by Parmenides or Melissus of Samos? But philosophy is not an invention of Plato or Socrates. Sophocles 'Antigone,' presented before Plato was born, gives a superior philosophical account of natural law and the conflict between legal authority (positivism) and moral authority (moral realism/natural law) than anything before Cicero in my mind, although in narrative stylistic form.
As a lifelong student of global history, it is implied proof that contemporaries will refute, sometimes virulently, the claims made by others about a person they adore, as Socrates was adored. Xenophon also spoke of Socrates. Some of the contemporary playwrights were not so kind. But in these, one can roughly ascertain a composite picture of what the true person was like. Modernist arrogance and prejudice have often discounted ancient historical accounts as fictions only to be later embarrassed (Troy, existence of the Hittites as a genuine and serious late Bronze Age power).
Another proof of authenticity, although not incontrovertible but supportive proof, is when a writer does not give a white sepulchered view of that person but a Dickensian assessment.
You are correct that I misspoke in saying that there was no way at all to record philosophy in a written text. Still, I stand by my statement that Plato was in some ways innovating a literary form, rather than recording Socrates exactly, and that this would have been understood by his readers.
Wikipedia backs me up on the main point: “It is widely understood that in later dialogues, Plato used the character Socrates to give voice to views that were his own.” https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socratic_problem
One last bit courtesy of Richard, of perhaps greater interest to Joel than Von is this: there is a presuppositionalistishistical bloke named Jeffrey Johnson, who wrote a book against the natural law tradition, it’s called something like Saving Natural Theology from Thomas Aquinas. Richard thought Johnson substantially missed the philosophical boat with this particular work, so submitted a response of sorts, a paper at a conference, one titled Saving Natural Theology from Jeffrey Johnson. You can hear the talk based on that paper behind a paywall at a certain podcast site, however Richard makes the PowerPoint slides associated with that talk available free on his extensive website. This PDF of the slides may take just a moment to load properly, but you can glean a very high percentage of what Richard had to say here:
Well this should be fun!
Theologically, for now at least, based upon what I’m so far convinced of, I’m mostly with Von here, the evangelical.
Philosophically however I’m with Mr Carini, on board with his natural theology and yes, common ground.
Both you gentlemen therefore may enjoy these talks by my evangelical Thomist friend Dr Richard Howe:
Presuppositionalism’s Fundamental Error
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Fx08ujGtRgY&pp=ygUXcmljaGFyZCBob3dlIGFwb2xvZ2V0aWM%3D
(6 minutes)
and
Apologetic Systems, a discussion with Howe and presuppositionalists K. Scott Oliphint and Jason Lisle
(2 hours)
Richard would say if you like this sort of thing you need therapy 😉
but you might also check out his
How Theology Needs Philosophy
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=2z4PO7R-CIY&t=2075s&pp=ygUTcmljaGFyZCBob3dlIHNhbHQxNA%3D%3D
(40 minutes)
and
Introduction to Natural Law
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=vcw0ptxOmxg&t=11s&pp=ygUacmljaGFyZCBnIGhvd2UgaW50b2R1Y3Rpb24%3D
(90 minutes)
I’m intrigued, Dan! I’ll give him a listen. And I’m still evangelical theologically, happily. 🙂
Well, you should love my man Richard. Another evangelical keen on appealing to, explaining natural law is Andrew T. Walker:
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ReOLHFTBJE4&pp=ygUPYW5kcmV3IHQgd2Fsa2Vy
I do think Richard is better as a philosopher, he’s substantially older and deeper into the material, the history and arguments, but Walker has his own strengths as a cultural commentator and much else:
https://www.sbts.edu/faculty/andrew-t-walker/
Yeah, no, I'm afraid that what you mean by 'common ground' and what we presupps mean by 'common ground' are two different things.
I didn't go into the epistemological detail in the article, but here's what I think "common ground" refers to: Common rational grounding for belief. The presuppositionalist view is that all thought begins from fundamental presuppositions, and those differ across worldviews. The only test of those fundamental presuppositions is the coherence of the worldview that flows from them.
I find, instead, that all ideological thinking, both materialist and theological, begins from presuppositions that the ideologues are either unable or unwilling to examine more deeply. True philosophical aims to examine even these presuppositions, and so, to leave no stone unturned. There are representatives of such thought among believers and unbelievers; Socrates, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Elizabeth Anscombe come to mind.
These thinkers begin from the common rational grounding of universal human experience and careful philosophical thought.
Have I mischaracterized the presupp view though? I don't see that we mean something different by "common ground." I think we disagree about whether there is common ground between and unbelievers. :)
‘Presuppositional’ is a somewhat ambiguous term. The tradition in America comes down from Cornelius Van Til. Then as I understand the landscape it branches into softer and harder versions. The mild version would be that of Francis Schaeffer. He simply emphasized that the unbeliever, based solely upon his stated beliefs, presuppositions would find it difficult or impossible to live his life. Because we are all made in the Image of God, we thirst for meaning and morality, truth and justice, which are meaningless in the atheist’s universe. So inevitably the unbelievers will reach over into the believer’s Judeo-Christian meaning system and borrow whole categories (e.g. human rights) to get through their day. Finding this point of tension, where the unbeliever must ‘cheat’ offers an opening for evangelism.
The harder Presup tradition comes down via Greg Bahnsen and those in his school of thought. Von’s doubts about any ‘common ground’ echo these presups’ insistence that there is no ‘neutral ground.’ For more, listen to Richard. A key point though, is that the Bahnsen tradition says that the unbeliever must PRESUPPOSE that Christianity is true BEFORE he can have any basis for rationality. But when queried on this, Richard finds that this collapses into GOD is the basis for meaning and truth, and NOT the presupposition of God, or Christianity. And Richard points out that everyone on all sides of the debate agree that GOD comes first, but this is not what Bahnsen and seemingly Van Til taught. They apparently DID insist that only after God and/or the Bible and/or Christianity is pressupposed to be true do the pieces all fall into place.
Others, including those in the Reforned tradition like R. C. Sproul object that this is but a circular argument, yielding a syllogism that runs something like this:
1) Christianity is True
2) Therefore, Christianity is True
3) Ain’t Christianity True?
🤓
More later, but my first comment would be that normally (like, pretty much every time I have heard it mentioned) presupp is talking about apologetics.
Not that I don’t find presupp relavent to general thought, but I have always used it in references to arguments about life etc.
Is what you refer to in the first paragraph really the presuppositionalist view? It seems that what you are getting at is just honest foundationalism, where the foundationalist acknowledges his foundational beliefs are not necessarily held by everyone. Doesn't presuppositionalism require one to hold that these presuppositions come from special revelation?
Somewhere (it might or might not be in any of the talks I linked you to) Richard avers that Van Til got his basic framework from the thinker and statesman Abraham Kuyper, who had borrowed key philosophical concepts—mistaken ones to be sure—from Immanuel Kant
Thanks for giving us a view of F3. I found it interesting to reflect on the society you are making there and the things you must all be getting from it.
When it comes to believing in something higher than yourself, how often do abstract concepts play that role? Jesus, Buddha, Allah and the guy next to you are all personified to some extent. Do you get people who throw out things like “truth” or “kindness” as their higher thing that they follow? Would it be accepted if they did?
I ask, because I have recently been mulling on Simone Weil’s admonition that “men whose attention, faith and love are almost exclusively concentrated on the impersonal aspect of God can actually believe themselves and declare themselves to be atheists.” I think she is on to something.
Dear Joel:
I need some clarification. Are you saying that this professor honestly believed that "Socrates was a utilitarian; he didn’t believe in an afterlife; and Platonism was and is consistent with a scientific worldview?"
How does he explain Phraedo wherein Plato's Socrates speaks of the psyche as immortal? How does he explain the concept of nous (mind) as governing the cosmos (panentheism), which goes back to Eleatics. Much of Plato's Forms or the knowledge of those Forms is premised upon metempsychosis, the Greek equivalent of reincarnation, which Plato picked up from Pythagoras.
Is Prof. B... intimating that Plato is putting words into Socrates' mouth, making Socrates say what Socrates never said? How could he, that dishonest slut! How could Plato get away with such prevarications, especially in light of his contemporaries who could stomp all over such mendacity?
I would contend, having experienced this throughout my life, that one can have no common ground with anyone who is not committed to intellectual integrity, even in part, including hermeneutical integrity. And this is true with regard to theists or non-theists, Christians or non-Christians.
It’s fairly common for philosophers and indeed historians to suggest that Plato’s Socrates does not always correspond to the historical Socrates. Generally, the view I have heard suggests that earlier dialogues are more likely to be records of what Plato remembered Socrates as saying, whereas later dialogues are Plato continuing to use the same literary form in order to develop his own ideas. It’s not that Plato is a liar, but that he started writing in a particular way and then continued in the same form, because the ideas being expounded were more important than who exactly they came from. There was no pre-existing way to record philosophy in a written text, so Plato was kind of making up his way of doing it as he went along.
Thank you for your reply. I do not understand the meaning of "there was no pre-existing way to record philosophy in a written text." I am not denying the stylistic innovations. Have you not read the fairly intact tracts by Parmenides or Melissus of Samos? But philosophy is not an invention of Plato or Socrates. Sophocles 'Antigone,' presented before Plato was born, gives a superior philosophical account of natural law and the conflict between legal authority (positivism) and moral authority (moral realism/natural law) than anything before Cicero in my mind, although in narrative stylistic form.
As a lifelong student of global history, it is implied proof that contemporaries will refute, sometimes virulently, the claims made by others about a person they adore, as Socrates was adored. Xenophon also spoke of Socrates. Some of the contemporary playwrights were not so kind. But in these, one can roughly ascertain a composite picture of what the true person was like. Modernist arrogance and prejudice have often discounted ancient historical accounts as fictions only to be later embarrassed (Troy, existence of the Hittites as a genuine and serious late Bronze Age power).
Another proof of authenticity, although not incontrovertible but supportive proof, is when a writer does not give a white sepulchered view of that person but a Dickensian assessment.
You are correct that I misspoke in saying that there was no way at all to record philosophy in a written text. Still, I stand by my statement that Plato was in some ways innovating a literary form, rather than recording Socrates exactly, and that this would have been understood by his readers.
Wikipedia backs me up on the main point: “It is widely understood that in later dialogues, Plato used the character Socrates to give voice to views that were his own.” https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socratic_problem
One last bit courtesy of Richard, of perhaps greater interest to Joel than Von is this: there is a presuppositionalistishistical bloke named Jeffrey Johnson, who wrote a book against the natural law tradition, it’s called something like Saving Natural Theology from Thomas Aquinas. Richard thought Johnson substantially missed the philosophical boat with this particular work, so submitted a response of sorts, a paper at a conference, one titled Saving Natural Theology from Jeffrey Johnson. You can hear the talk based on that paper behind a paywall at a certain podcast site, however Richard makes the PowerPoint slides associated with that talk available free on his extensive website. This PDF of the slides may take just a moment to load properly, but you can glean a very high percentage of what Richard had to say here:
http://richardghowe.com/index_htm_files/SavingNaturalTheology.pdf