I hate to always be disagreeing with you, Dr. Carini, but I shall do so again. I am not an empiricist or an Aristotelian (Plato>>>Aristotle), and that is the nub of my disagreement. Pure experience does not exist, since the human mind comes into existence with certain innate ideas, and cannot interpret experience without them. The idea of causality cannot be derived from experience. Apart from our innate belief in the principle of sufficient reason, we would have no reason to believe that things have causes and thus no reason to seek out reasons. Someone who denies the principle of sufficient reason, and there are plenty of such people, is not sane, and cannot be reasoned with. You will find no common ground with him when attempting to reason about things of ultimate importance.
In addition, purely linguistic arguments without reference to experience actually do work in some cases, regardless of whether the ontological argument is successful. I am a mathematician in my last year of a PhD program, so the obvious example for me is Gödel's incompleteness theorem. This result tells us something about the real world. For instance, it tells me that a computer program capable of doing certain basic arithmetical reasoning cannot be used to prove its own reliability (I haven't done mathematical logic in two years, and it isn't my field, so if you want details, I can get them, but I would need to do a little review first). I have other objections (you misunderstand Lutheran political theology), but this is already overlong.
I’ve had much longer comments! And for a philosopher, it is an honor to receive cogent critique - no apologies are qualifications necessary. I’d like to hear clarification of the Lutheran political theology point, so go ahead and let me know.
On empiricism, my thesis is that cognition of objects requires the reception of empirical input. It is not that the senses do all the work; I’m a Kantian as well on that point. Rather than innate ideas, I would contend for something like innate questions. The PSR corresponds to the innate question, “Why?” I think both Kant’s and Aristotle’s categories (Kant attributed his categories to Aristotle) are the various questions, “Why? “When?” “How much?” etc. Thus, our questions are to some extent proper to experience. But all answers are posterior.
What of mathematics? I received that question in my prospectus defense a few weeks ago. #1: I don’t accept that there are objects of mathematical cognition, i.e., abstract, immaterial numbers. This is because equations are not propositions. Propositions must make some reference to objects and then predicate something of an object (or objects, or a kind). But mathematical equations abstract from all objects. Example: “If you have two avocados, and then I give you two more, you’ll have four avocados.” That’s a proposition. “2 + 2 = 4.” That gives you something like the form of all empirical statements of the first type.
Anyways, I also don’t want to go on too long, but that is the start to my account of mathematics and why it’s not empirical, because it’s not cognition of objects, but mere form.
On mathematical logic, Gödel, etc., my suspicions extended there, but more due to the conventional nature of logical systems and methods of proof. I’m very prepared for mathematicians not to be happy with my perspective there, though I should also say that analytic philosophers are, if anything, even more unhappy with me for “overstepping the boundaries of the discipline!” (Of course, I think it’s the mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics who are overstepping the bounds of their respective disciplines.)
But bring on the pushback! Thanks for listening and reading.
In addition, I thought I might say a few things about empirical statements. Things can, at least in principal, be known apart from experience because that is necessarily how God knows everything, since He is by nature unchanging, and thus cannot learn.
As for mathematics, even if they are not objects, numbers are at very least properties, and aren’t properties objects? If they aren’t objects, what are they? They aren’t nothing, and they aren’t God, so it seems they can only be objects, abstract objects, but objects all the same. But you are right to focus on abstraction, since that is what mathematics is about. I would describe it as the study of structure, akin to grammar, but instead of for a language, for reality. But the laws of English grammar are objects, even if they are manmade objects. And these objects exist, eternal and unchanging, in the mind of God, since they follow ineluctably from the rationality which is essential to the Divine Being.
Sorry I am so late in responding, I didn’t see this right away. And you are right that a mathematician is not going to appreciate your criticisms. Political theology isn’t really my expertise, but I will take a go at it. You are right that in general we are less willing to actively resist government (I mean, I take the controversial opinion that the American Revolution was wrong, so I am certainly not keen on any form of rebellion!) Luther’s own tow Kingdom’s theology basically put everything in the second kingdom. Which is the domain of the second greatest commandment. Even the institutional church is in the Kingdom of law, at least to some extent. The Kingdom of Grace is the one in which forgiveness is offered while the Kingdom of law enforces justice and punishment for the maintenance of temporal order. The state has a duty to maintain this order, and that includes the moral law. When state’s act unjustly, some Lutherans believe that lesser magistrates can resist (this theory developed in response to the Emperor fighting the reformation, and was to be implemented by the princes). Others might take issue with this and argue for Berkeley style passive obedience. My own opinion is undecided on this issue. Part of me wants to take Romans thirteen as an absolute prohibition on rebellion, but that stance seems hard to justify in 1944, say. But what I am saying is that the Lutheran tradition had ideas about just and unjust state action. The state can be disobeyed, albeit perhaps not violently. But even Calvin is opposed to violent resistance, and his suggestion to Huguenots is to leave or accept martyrdom, not to resist.
I had a wonderful time in this conversation, my friend; thank you for your time and for writing such a great book! It was a delight to read.
I hate to always be disagreeing with you, Dr. Carini, but I shall do so again. I am not an empiricist or an Aristotelian (Plato>>>Aristotle), and that is the nub of my disagreement. Pure experience does not exist, since the human mind comes into existence with certain innate ideas, and cannot interpret experience without them. The idea of causality cannot be derived from experience. Apart from our innate belief in the principle of sufficient reason, we would have no reason to believe that things have causes and thus no reason to seek out reasons. Someone who denies the principle of sufficient reason, and there are plenty of such people, is not sane, and cannot be reasoned with. You will find no common ground with him when attempting to reason about things of ultimate importance.
In addition, purely linguistic arguments without reference to experience actually do work in some cases, regardless of whether the ontological argument is successful. I am a mathematician in my last year of a PhD program, so the obvious example for me is Gödel's incompleteness theorem. This result tells us something about the real world. For instance, it tells me that a computer program capable of doing certain basic arithmetical reasoning cannot be used to prove its own reliability (I haven't done mathematical logic in two years, and it isn't my field, so if you want details, I can get them, but I would need to do a little review first). I have other objections (you misunderstand Lutheran political theology), but this is already overlong.
I’ve had much longer comments! And for a philosopher, it is an honor to receive cogent critique - no apologies are qualifications necessary. I’d like to hear clarification of the Lutheran political theology point, so go ahead and let me know.
On empiricism, my thesis is that cognition of objects requires the reception of empirical input. It is not that the senses do all the work; I’m a Kantian as well on that point. Rather than innate ideas, I would contend for something like innate questions. The PSR corresponds to the innate question, “Why?” I think both Kant’s and Aristotle’s categories (Kant attributed his categories to Aristotle) are the various questions, “Why? “When?” “How much?” etc. Thus, our questions are to some extent proper to experience. But all answers are posterior.
What of mathematics? I received that question in my prospectus defense a few weeks ago. #1: I don’t accept that there are objects of mathematical cognition, i.e., abstract, immaterial numbers. This is because equations are not propositions. Propositions must make some reference to objects and then predicate something of an object (or objects, or a kind). But mathematical equations abstract from all objects. Example: “If you have two avocados, and then I give you two more, you’ll have four avocados.” That’s a proposition. “2 + 2 = 4.” That gives you something like the form of all empirical statements of the first type.
Anyways, I also don’t want to go on too long, but that is the start to my account of mathematics and why it’s not empirical, because it’s not cognition of objects, but mere form.
On mathematical logic, Gödel, etc., my suspicions extended there, but more due to the conventional nature of logical systems and methods of proof. I’m very prepared for mathematicians not to be happy with my perspective there, though I should also say that analytic philosophers are, if anything, even more unhappy with me for “overstepping the boundaries of the discipline!” (Of course, I think it’s the mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics who are overstepping the bounds of their respective disciplines.)
But bring on the pushback! Thanks for listening and reading.
In addition, I thought I might say a few things about empirical statements. Things can, at least in principal, be known apart from experience because that is necessarily how God knows everything, since He is by nature unchanging, and thus cannot learn.
As for mathematics, even if they are not objects, numbers are at very least properties, and aren’t properties objects? If they aren’t objects, what are they? They aren’t nothing, and they aren’t God, so it seems they can only be objects, abstract objects, but objects all the same. But you are right to focus on abstraction, since that is what mathematics is about. I would describe it as the study of structure, akin to grammar, but instead of for a language, for reality. But the laws of English grammar are objects, even if they are manmade objects. And these objects exist, eternal and unchanging, in the mind of God, since they follow ineluctably from the rationality which is essential to the Divine Being.
Sorry I am so late in responding, I didn’t see this right away. And you are right that a mathematician is not going to appreciate your criticisms. Political theology isn’t really my expertise, but I will take a go at it. You are right that in general we are less willing to actively resist government (I mean, I take the controversial opinion that the American Revolution was wrong, so I am certainly not keen on any form of rebellion!) Luther’s own tow Kingdom’s theology basically put everything in the second kingdom. Which is the domain of the second greatest commandment. Even the institutional church is in the Kingdom of law, at least to some extent. The Kingdom of Grace is the one in which forgiveness is offered while the Kingdom of law enforces justice and punishment for the maintenance of temporal order. The state has a duty to maintain this order, and that includes the moral law. When state’s act unjustly, some Lutherans believe that lesser magistrates can resist (this theory developed in response to the Emperor fighting the reformation, and was to be implemented by the princes). Others might take issue with this and argue for Berkeley style passive obedience. My own opinion is undecided on this issue. Part of me wants to take Romans thirteen as an absolute prohibition on rebellion, but that stance seems hard to justify in 1944, say. But what I am saying is that the Lutheran tradition had ideas about just and unjust state action. The state can be disobeyed, albeit perhaps not violently. But even Calvin is opposed to violent resistance, and his suggestion to Huguenots is to leave or accept martyrdom, not to resist.