Is It More Rational to Hold "The Scientific Worldview" than to Believe?
No. Rationality Itself Is a Canard.
There is a persistent belief among the Western intelligentsia that believing in Christianity is irrational and that it is the purportedly “scientific worldview” that exhibits rationality.
Even with the rise of thinkers who defend the social utility of Christianity, they remain beholden to the idea that it is irrational or sub-rational to believe in Christianity. Some defenders of Christianity emphasize the non-rationality of belief, that faith is indebted to symbolic thinking instead.
But I struggle to discover what this “rationality” is that is so firmly on the side of “The Scientific Worldview” and opposed to belief in God or the miracles of Christianity.
For instance, is it following the laws of logic? But the laws of logic don’t play any special role in deciding things in favor of “The Scientific Worldview.” Scientists rarely take courses in logic; it is not, after all, deductive reasoning but inductive reasoning that is prominent in science. And induction leads us to some rather peculiar and unreasonable, yet apparently true, places.
Is it determining one’s beliefs all and only by scientific methods? Then the word “rational” is not doing any work. The virtue of the person with “The Scientific Worldview” would be that of being scientific in all his or her thinking.
But should you be scientific in arenas of life - like the artistic realm? Should I analyze paintings by their scientific qualities? Should I analyze music primarily by its scientific qualities?
This would seem to be a case of applying criteria of one area of life to areas in which they are not applicable or, at least, central. It would seem to exhibit the vice of rationalism rather than the virtue of rationality.
I am left with the thought that the rational and the non-rational have simply to do with left-brain thinking and right-brain thinking. In this case, we would conclude that people who focus on left-brain thinking - scientists and engineers, and the like - hold to “The Scientific Worldview” in greater numbers than those who incorporate more right-brain thinking. This is itself an empirical hypothesis, and one that I presume is true.
And yet, are people more rational in a logical sense (more likely to have true beliefs) by leaning on the left-brain? Or are they simply more rational in the psychological sense, i.e., left-brained?
If rationality reduces to left-brainedness, then we could perform the following translations: “It is more rational to believe in the scientific worldview than in Christianity,” becomes, “It is more left-brained to believe in the scientific worldview than in Christianity.” Indeed.
“Christianity requires a leap of faith, beyond reason,” becomes, “Christianity requires a functioning right hemisphere, in addition to a left hemisphere.” All of a sudden, the purported rationality of the scientific worldview appears less impressive. The irrationality of Christianity begins to seem like a virtue.
But perhaps I’ve been too hasty. Let’s consider the different senses of “rational” in turn.
1. Rational = Following the dictates of logic or reason
In philosophy, there is a long-standing duality between two (sets of) mental faculties: Reason and the senses. Reason appears to be in play in verbal thinking, armchair philosophy, logic and mathematics, and the theoretical and hypothesizing side of natural science. The senses are utilized in the experimental or empirical side of scientific observation, musical and artistic creation and appreciation, and active data-gathering.
To be most rational, by this standard, is to have beliefs that are derived from the first set of faculties. However, it would be odd to think this will lead to “The Scientific Worldview.” After all, the faculties of scientific endeavor cut across the divide, including the theoretical and hypothesizing work of reason and the empirical and experimental aspect of scientific work of the senses.
Those who favor the first set of faculties would include many great armchair philosophers and men of letters who have never slavishly adhered to the scientific worldview. Those who focus on logic and mathematics are frequently drawn to varieties of Platonism and idealism that contradict the scientific worldview.
What is more, the chief virtue of modern science is its experimental and empirical character. This is what determines that its statements are not merely theories in our heads. While the work of Thomas Kuhn has shown the scientific community how much the theoretical role is crucial in scientific endeavor - science is not merely collecting empirical data-points, but even observation is theory-laden - it is still the case that the goal is for theory to be confirmed by observation.
Thus, if you wanted to boast about the virtues of having a worldview that is scientific, I would think you would favor the word empirical rather than rational. After all, all the objects of natural science are - at least distally - available to the five human senses, amplified by scientific instruments. God, angels, and miracles, by comparison, are either not available to the senses (in the case of God and angels) or in contradiction to what we observe with the senses (bodies acting in accord with the laws of nature).
2. Rational = Abiding by Methodological Naturalism
Another proposal would be that rationality leads to the scientific worldview because rationality requires abiding by methodological naturalism in one’s thought.
Philosophers distinguish between methodological and metaphysical naturalism. Methodological naturalism is a proposed principle of science that only objects of the natural world are to be appealed to in scientific theory. Metaphysical naturalism is a philosophy according to which only the objects of the natural world, described by and available to scientific theory, exist. (Metaphysical naturalism is coterminous with “The Scientific Worldview.”)
Many people, however, believe that methodological naturalism leads to metaphysical naturalism. If you follow methodological naturalism in your scientific theorizing, you should end up with metaphysical naturalism as your worldview. However, this only follows if the only contributor to your worldview is your scientific theorizing. But that is not obvious.
After all, a theist can accept into his or her worldview all the entities that scientific study turns up but think that in addition there are some other entities we know about through some other means, say, revelation or metaphysical reasoning.
In doing so, he would abide by methodological naturalism in all his scientific theorizing, but not in his metaphysical speculation or Scriptural interpretation. After all, methodological naturalism is a purported principle of science, not of thought itself. Or is it?
The stronger claim, that methodological naturalism is a principle of thought itself, is subtly assumed by many metaphysical naturalists. Of course, if methodological naturalism is a principle of thought, then believing in the supernatural would be irrational, since it would go against one of the principles of thought itself.
However, I don’t think that methodological naturalism is a principle of thought. I think it’s a principle of natural science. For instance, if I want to explain why water boils and I appeal to the action of angels, then I am not explaining how the natural world works. I am arguing that water boiling is a supernatural event, inexplicable in natural terms.
Now a theory is not immediately wrong, simply because it appeals to a supernatural agent. However, it is quite plausible that it is not a theory of natural science simpliciter if it appeals to a supernatural agent. Natural science may not explain everything, but where we must appeal to angels, we are no longer doing natural science.
In short, methodological naturalism is a constraint on scientific thought; but it does not follow that all thought must abide by methodological naturalism.
And therefore, it is not irrational to depart from the metaphysical naturalist worldview, that is, “The Scientific Worldview.”
3. Rational = Occam’s Razor
Another proposal for the rationality of the scientific worldview is that it consists in abiding by Occam’s razor, or the principle of ontological parsimony: That theory is to be preferred that postulates the fewest entities (or kinds of entities), or which is simplest.
Given that theism postulates at least one more entity than naturalism (and a whole different kind of entity), naturalism is the more parsimonious metaphysic. Yet the question simply remains which is the most parsimonious to explain the phenomena of the world around us. If a man in the first century walked on water, fed the five thousand, fulfilled dozens of hundreds-year old prophecies, and then rose from the dead and ascended into heaven, then naturalism appears to be too parsimonious, and not generous enough to accommodate all the information.
So Occam’s razor and ontological parsimony are not sufficient to determine which worldview is superior. In fact, we need to appeal to the senses, including to historical experience, to know what our worldview must be sufficient to explain. Again, it is adequacy to the empirical data that is the test of a worldview, not mere rational criteria, like simplicity.
4. Rational = Continuing to Think What You Already Think
But that brings us to another option. After all, isn’t the prior probability against those miracles having happened simply too high to up-end our worldview to accommodate them?
(See
’s, “Why I’m Not a Christian?” the subtitle of which is “TL;DR: The prior probability is too low”; uses prior probability to argue for God; and philosopher uses the very idea of prior probabilities to argue against empiricism/evidentialism.)Imagine a young philosopher, educated in the natural sciences, but devoid of religious belief. If you bring him reports of miracles, and two-millennia old miracles at that, how quick should he be to up-end my worldview to accommodate that information? Isn’t it more sensible to assume that the reports were fabricated than to postulate an entire supernatural and divine realm in addition to the natural realm? And all on the basis of first-century testimony?
On this view, rationality is essential about sticking to one’s guns, resting content with what you already think and not giving in to contrary evidence too quickly. On this view, the classic epistemological divide between the logical, a priori faculty of thought and the empirical, a posteriori faculty of thought collapses into the difference between prior and posterior, literally, before and after: What I thought before, and what I would think after.
“I know a priori that that can’t be true,” becomes, “I already don’t think that, so why would I change?” Of course, the answer is, if there is new evidence. Sticking to what you already think is not inherently rational. In particular, it ceases to be reasonable to think that in the moment when new evidence emerges.
While this Bayesian account of rationality or the a priori has sophisticated defenders, the most interesting things about the world are those that are true that we wouldn’t have thought would be true. (See
’s brilliant thesis, “The True Isn’t the Rational.”)In fact, the fact that I would assign a high prior probability to something is not evidence one way or another. It’s simply a fact about me.
And in the end, I think that that is all rationality reduces to: Facts about me. In particular, what it is rational to think reduces to what relatively left-brained people would or do think in my socio-cultural context.
5. Rational = Thinking What the Majority of Today’s Left-Brained People Think
In the 21st century, someone with an elite position in the sciences is relatively more likely to hold to “the scientific worldview.” But in the early 19th century, it was more likely that someone with an elite position in the sciences would hold to Christianity, and especially to a pro-science version of Christianity.
The predominant views of scientists from the 1600s to the mid-1800s was a Christian, theistic view, influenced by modern philosophy, like that of Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton. A reasonable person at that time would be expected to be familiar with the sciences, but also with philosophy and Christian theology and to have some view of the interplay between them and the boundaries of their own discipline.
Now people like Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton were plenty left-brained. But the majority of the left-brained people of their time were believers.
I am afraid that when today’s atheists insist that they are rational and so it’s hard to believe in Christianity even if they want to, that they are merely saying that people of their personality type, in our times, predominantly hold one worldview, and so it is difficult psychologically to make a change. This provides no evidence or argument that metaphysical naturalism is adequate to explain the world around us. It does not even address the arguments and evidence in favor of theism or Christianity.
“I’m too rational to believe in God” becomes, “Left-brained people like me don’t currently believe in miracles and God, so it would go against the current thinking of left-brained people like me to believe in miracles and God.”
Yes, it would. But the current thinking of left-brained people is inadequate to explain a wide variety of phenomena of human experience and scientific observation. Perhaps that thinking needs to change.
Not Rational, But Empirical
Alvin Plantinga famously demurred to defend Christianity’s truth in volume three of his magnum opus, Warranted Christian Belief. Instead, he tries merely to defend the rationality of Christians who believe it. If Christianity were true, he reasons, God would have some button he could push with the Holy Spirit in our brain to make us know that Christianity was true. Impressive.
But I have no interest in defending something called the “rationality” of Christian belief. Does Christianity conform to our Bayesian priors? Is it consistent with logic? Does it abide by the principles of thought? Is it consonant with the thinking of the majority of today’s left-brained science-y types?
Who cares? If Christianity is true, it really doesn’t matter if it conforms to any of these - except the basic logic of the not contradicting itself. If the evidence is in favor of Christianity, or simply theism, we should believe that whether it fits with our priors or not.
It all comes down to evidence and empiricism. What do we actually observe in the world, and what metaphysics suffices to explain it all?
The question is not whether “The Scientific Worldview” or Christianity is rational.
The question is whether they are empirical. What metaphysics best explains the empirical data of the world around us and human experience? What does the evidence show?
[Nicodemus] came to Jesus by night and said to him, “Rabbi, we know that you are a teacher come from God, for no one can do these signs that you do unless God is with him.”
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Good article, Joel. I hope you and the family are well.
I think what a lot of people mean when they accuse Christians of not holding to the 'scientific worldview' is simply not holding to naturalistic Darwinism, which is itself an empirical system with many more implied miracles than Christianity. It's a bait-and-switch of sorts, using the term 'science' in its most rigorous sense (i.e., falsifiable truth claims backed by sufficient experimentation to establish a hypothesis as a scientific theory) but applied to a group of atheistic true-believers who prefer their dogmas be accepted as scientific truth rather than the non-falsifiable claims they really turn out to be upon closer inspection.
Using your terminology to restate something I have thought since I was a young man:
Methodological naturalism causes origin of life researchers to publish research that only mentions naturalistic hypotheses for the origin of life, without mention of a supernatural Creator.
But nothing in methodological naturalism requires that such researchers claim that their current hypotheses are very satisfying or convincing. It is perfectly in accord with methodological naturalism to say "We have been investigating naturalistic explanations for the origin of life, and current we have significant unresolved issues, so that we cannot claim we are close to having a convincing explanation." No God references are needed in this honest and scientifically humble statement.
However, philosophical naturalism makes it very unsatisfying to make this statement, especially in a society where the ever-present boogeyman of the religious creationist lurks. Thus, the philosophical naturalist is tempted to overstate the degree of current naturalistic understanding of the origin of life problem. In such overstating, are they being "rational" in some sense? I think not.